Iran launched an aerial attack on Israel on April 13, 2024, via a combination of drones and cruise and ballistic missiles. It was unprecedented in character—Iran has never originated an attack against Israel from its own territory—and yet measured in scope. As some analysts have already observed, the scale of the airstrikes seems to have demonstrated a desire to both punish Israel and show that Iran is not interested in a regional war. The 300 or so projectiles sought military rather than civilian sites, with the apparent understanding that most would not hit successfully, and Iranian ally Hezbollah was not party to the attack.

None of that ensures that the airstrikes were received as intended, or hoped. As noted, an open (and announced) military attack on one from the territory of the other defies the unwritten rules of the decades-long Israeli-Iranian conflict. While Iranian leaders clearly felt the need to assert deterrence rationale after Israel’s attack on the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus that killed several members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, based on Israel officials’ public statements, they view the attack as a dramatic escalatory step that demands a similar reassertion of military deterrence.

So, what does this mean?

The next phase of the dispute, and the potential for its expansion into regional warfare, depends on Israel’s response. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is under immense pressure from the right-wing members of his coalition to issue devastating retaliation against Iran itself, rather than Iranian proxies, as has been common in the past. Given his apparent disinterest in US pleas that the Israeli Defense Force moderate its actions in Gaza, it’s possible that Netanyahu chooses to escalate.

This would be exceptional, which is why it remains unlikely, despite the demands of his right-wing allies. An aggressive response against Iran risks far more than an escalating tit-for-tat. It risks further deterioration in the US-Israel relationship that could prove significant should President Joe Biden win reelection. Netanyahu would have to be certain that the US would support Israel in any and all scenarios, including war, because a massive reply would again pressure Tehran to do the same.

As might be obvious, this would risk the stability of Israel itself, already facing significant strategic and material constraints from the ongoing offensive in Gaza. While Israel may be planning an eventual confrontation with Hezbollah, escalating with Iran could force an engagement with another adversary on its borders in unfavorable circumstances. Lastly, though undoubtedly minor compared to the issues just noted, Netanyahu’s personal history suggests he will be considering the costs to his political livelihood should he miscalculate the Israeli public’s desire for an expanded conflict.

In recent months Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian has taken steps to prove that his foreign minister was truthful in stating, on March 9, 2024, that Armenia is close to requesting EU membership. In late March, Pashinian announced that Armenia was suspending its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Moscow-led military coalition that Russia has used to intervene in a series of regional disputes, including in Kazakhstan in early 2022. The Armenian foreign minister also chose not to attend a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) meeting on April 12, in additional demonstration of Yerevan’s discontent. And, at meeting between Pashinian, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and representatives of the EU in early April, the EU committed to an aid package of nearly EUR 300 million.

This begs the question: why are Pashinian and the Armenian government ready to distance the country from Russia-led regional organizations in favor of the EU, despite the obvious risks? In large part, the Armenian leadership feels that Russia failed to uphold the terms of its role as peacekeeper between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan used a rapid military offensive to retake the rest of Nagono-Karabakh in September 2023, despite the presence of Russian troops on the ground. If Russia could not uphold its presumed status as guarantor of what Armenia considered to be its sovereign territory, the relationship had proven to be of little use.

So, what does this mean?

Pashinian is gambling that Armenia’s future lies with the European Union and the West more generally. This is, without a doubt, a serious gamble, and one that Russia has already expressed anger about. In the past two decades, two former Soviet republics have made it known that they were moving away from Moscow in favor of closer partnerships with the West. Both—Georgia and Ukraine—were invaded by Russia.

The Armenian situation is different, in that it does not share a land border with Russia, is not making overtures to NATO, and does not pose much of a strategic or economic threat. But it shares multiple borders with Azerbaijan, which has recently hosted Russian troops and has soundly defeated Armenian in more than one military engagement in the past 4 years, is led by a democratic coalition that ended decades of Russia-friendly autocracy, and represents further symbolic degradation of Russia’s role as regional hegemon. This could be enough for Putin to move against Pashinian.