Past weeks have seen Russian President Vladimir Putin expand his purge of defense ministry officials in conjunction with the removal and reassignment of former ministry head Sergei Shoigu. Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, long-rumored to have used his status to amass extreme wealth, was arrested on charges of corruption, followed more recently by Lt. General Yuri Kuznetsov, also detained for corruption-related offenses.

Shoigu’s removal set off a series of other positional maneuvers involving high-level elites. Nikolai Patrushev, former secretary of the security council, was replaced by Shoigu and demoted to an ambiguous position as a presidential aide. Shoigu’s position was filled by Andrei Belousov, former first deputy minister of economic affairs who had no previous connection to the military.

As defense ministry officials are purged and reassigned, the Russian military continues to target Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine. A missile strike on a large department store in Kharkiv on May 25, 2024, killed at least 10 Ukrainians with many more unaccounted for. A full-scale incursion against Kharkiv still appears unlikely, as a the cost of such a venture would be immense.

So, what does this mean?

While the ongoing purge of defense ministry officials and other elites has involved high-profile figures, it has moved at a restrained pace and without а huge number of victims, at least thus far. Putin is not known for acting impulsively to avenge perceived slights and failures, but his move against the defense ministry, which has been the target of criticism since the start of the war, is especially measured. After all, the defense ministry was purportedly the raison d’etre of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s months of angry exhortations against the war effort, and of his eventual (and eventually aborted) move on Moscow.

Considering the time it took Putin to initiate this purge, it would be surprising if Kuznetsov’s arrest was the last move. The defense ministry is rumored to be riddled with corruption and has no shortage of mid-level elites with shadowy financial histories. It would seem more likely, in fact, that the purge will escalate. The Russian military’s success and his own inauguration given Putin freer reign to continue pursuing those he considers at fault for Prigozhin’s excesses and the failures that marked the start of the war.

Georgian Dream expected to override presidential veto, pass “foreign agents” bill on May 28th

Georgia’s ruling party, the Georgian Dream, reportedly intends to override President Salome Zourabichvili’s veto of the controversial “foreign agents” bill on May 28, 2024. The Georgian version of the bill is similar to one passed in Russia in 2012 that has since been expanded and used to root out and destroy organizations independent of the Russian government. Georgia’s foreign agents bill would require organizations receiving more than 20 percent of their funding from foreign sources to register with the justice department. The government contends that the bill will prevent undue foreign influence, while domestic and international critics, particularly those in western Europe, argue that it will undermine Georgian democracy and enhance Russian influence.

So, what does this mean?

The veto override is expected to be a formality, as the Georgian Dream has the necessary supermajority required to pass the bill. Nevertheless, it is a radical step for the current government to take. Passage of the bill would likely end Georgia’s chances of joining the EU—to which it was given candidate status in December 2023—in the medium term. It will also likely be met with further large-scale protests, perhaps even more intense, and provoking an even more aggressive response from government forces, than those that have shaken Tbilisi in the past month.

The Georgian case is an interesting contrast to that of Armenia, which has made apparent its desire to break from Russian domination and build its relations with the EU. Both choices carry immense risk. Putin will probably want to build on military success in Ukraine by reasserting Russia’s presence elsewhere in post-Soviet Eurasia. Georgia is particularly vulnerable given its size and border with several of Russia’s pseudo-autonomous regions. The foreign agents law will open it to greater pressure from the Kremlin. On the other hand, Armenia’s recent military defeats and outward display of animosity toward Moscow will make it a target of Russian influence operations and will incentivize the Kremlin to lean toward Azerbaijan in regional disputes.